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OVERVIEW 
In contrast to uniformly pessimistic assessments about Sub-Saharan Africa￿s 
(hereafter Africa) ability to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), this paper 
examines recent trends in poverty, malnutrition, and growth to delineate where the 
challenges are the greatest within the entire region and sub-region and to highlight 
informative cases of success in specific countries.  The performance of agriculture, 
especially smallholder agriculture, receives particular attention due to its role in 
sustaining the livelihoods of a majority of Africa￿s poor.  In recent years, the importance 
of smallholder agriculture has been greatly recognized, demonstrated by both African 
governments and the donor community pledging to engage in the requisite interventions 
for generating agricultural growth.  By seizing on this new enthusiasm and learning from 
case studies of smallholder successes, agriculture could significantly contribute to 
Africa￿s ability to meet the MDGs.      vi  7
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I.  BROAD TRENDS IN AFRICA 
Currently, Africa is far from achieving the two targets constituting the first MDG:  
halve between 1990 and 2015 both the proportion of people living below $1 dollar a day 
and the proportion of people who suffer from hunger.  Indeed, Africa not only has the 
world￿s highest proportion of its population living below the international poverty line 
but also experienced an increase in this proportion from 47.4 percent in 1990 to 49 
percent by 2000 (World Bank MDG database).  Meeting the first MDG target requires 
Africa to achieve an annual GDP growth rate of 7 percent (AfDB 2003).  Yet, according 
to Table 1, only 10 out of 37 African countries have achieved a 5 percent or higher 
average GDP growth rate between 1997 and 2003.  As a whole, Africa is growing at 
about 3 percent and if it continues according to this trend, projections indicate that 42.3 
percent of the population will remain in poverty by 2015 rather than the target of 23.7 
percent (World Bank MDG database).   
Likewise, at 33 percent, Africa has the world￿s highest percentage of 
undernourished people, and this proportion has only improved by 3 percent since 1990.   
Children are particularly vulnerable with an average of 24 percent underweight and 35 
percent stunted by 2000 (UNSCN 2004).  As Table 2 shows, the percentage of children 
underweight or stunted is higher in the rural than the urban areas in all countries for 
which recent data is available.   
Considering that agriculture is the primary source of livelihood for approximately 
65 percent of Africans, represents between 30 and 40 percent of African GDP and 
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accounts for almost 60 percent of Africa￿s export income, reducing these high levels of 
poverty and hunger in Africa will require greater agricultural and rural development 
(IFAD 2003).  More specifically, this agricultural growth must be centered on the small 
farmer since small-scale farms account for over 90 percent of Africa￿s agricultural 
production and are dominated by the poor (Spencer 2001).  According to the MDG￿s 
Hunger Task Force, smallholder-farming systems also contain 75 percent of Africa￿s 
underweight children (Millennium Project Task Force 2004).     
On an aggregate level, however, progress at promoting smallholder growth over 
the last decade has been elusive.  Although per capita agricultural incomes have slightly 
improved, reaching $163 by 2002 compared with $151 in 1990, both per capita 
agricultural and food production remains at their 1990 level.  In fact, food insecurity 
remains a major problem, requiring shipments of over 3 million market tons of cereal 
food aid in 2002 and resulting in food emergencies in 24 African countries by early 2004 
(FAOSTAT; FAO GIEWS).   
These trends reflect the cumulative legacy of multiple, well-known factors.   
Among many others, they include low land productivity, inadequate rural infrastructure, 
vulnerability to natural disasters, inappropriately designed or partially implemented 
structural adjustment programs, and high levels of insecurity.   In fact, most of the 
countries in Table 1 with the lowest average GDP growth rates between 1997 and 2003, 
including Burundi, C￿te d￿Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, 
Sierra Leone, and Zimbabwe have experienced civil conflict, border wars, and/ or 
extreme political instability during the same period.  In addition, Africa is plagued by a 
high prevalence of HIV/AIDS, which, among other things, decreases labor productivity, 
erodes assets, and blocks the transfer of knowledge from one generation to the next.  
According to the FAO, the pandemic has already reduced national economic growth rates 
across Africa by about 2 to 4 percent a year (FAO 2003).     9
Table 1:  Comparison of Annual GDP Growth Rates Across Countries and Sub-Regions 
Countries & Sub-Regions  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  1997-2003 
Africa  3.9 2.4 2.7 3.2 3.7 3.5 3.5 3.3 
Angola  7.9 6.8 3.3  3  3.2  15.3  4.5 6.3 
Botswana  6.7 5.9 5.5 7.5 5.2 3.9 5.4 5.7 
Lesotho  4.8 -3.5 0.5 1.9 3.3 3.8 3.9 2.1 
Malawi  3.8  3.3 4 1.1  -4.2  1.8  4.4  2.0 
Mozambique  11.1 12.6  7.5  1.5  13  7.7  7  8.6 
Namibia  4.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 2.3 3.3 3.7 3.4 
South  Africa  2.6 0.8  2  3.5 2.7 3.6 1.9 2.4 
Swaziland  3.8 3.3 3.6 1.9 1.7 3.6 2.2 2.9 
Zambia  3.3 -1.9 2.2 3.6 4.9 3.3 4.2 2.8 
Zimbabwe  1.4  0.8 -4.1 -6.8 -8.8  -12.8  -13.2 -6.2 
Southern  Africa  5.0 3.1 2.8 2.1 2.3 3.4 2.4 3.0 
Benin  5.7 4.6 4.7 5.8  5  6  5.5 5.3 
Burkina Faso  6.8 8.5 3.7 1.5 5.9 4.4 6.5 5.3 
Cameroon  5.1  5  4.4 4.2 5.3 6.5 4.2 5.0 
Central  African  Rep.  7.5 3.9 3.6 1.8  1  -0.8  -5.8 1.6 
Chad  4.2 7.7 2.3  1  9.5 9.9 10  6.4 
Congo,  Rep.  -0.6  3.7 -3 8.2  3.6  3.5  0.8 2.3 
Cote  d’Ivoire  5.7 4.8 1.6 -2.3 0.1 -1.6 -3.8 0.6 
Gabon 5.7  3.5  -8.9  -1.9  2  0  2.8  0.5 
Gambia  4.9 6.5 6.4 5.5 5.8 -3.2 8.7 4.9 
Ghana  4.2 4.7 4.4 3.7 4.2 4.5 4.7 4.3 
Guinea  5  4.8 4.6 1.9 3.8 4.2 2.1 3.8 
Guinea-Bissau  6.5  -27.2  7.6 7.5 0.2 -7.2  -1.2 -2.0 
Mali  6.1 8.7  3  -3.2  13.3  4.4 3.2 5.1 
Mauritania  2.8 3.9 5.2 5.2  4  3.3 4.2 4.1 
Niger 2.8  10.4  -0.6  -1.4  7.1  3  4  3.6 
Nigeria  3.2 0.3 1.5 5.4  3  1.5  10.6 3.6 
Senegal  5 5.7 5 5.6  5.6  1.1  6.3  4.9 
Sierra  Leone  -17.6  -0.8  -8.1 3.8 5.4 6.3 6.5 -0.6 
Togo  3.5 -2.3 2.4 -0.8 -0.2 4.6 3.1  1.5 
West  Africa  3.5 3.0 2.1 2.7 4.5 2.7 3.8 3.2 
Burundi  0  4.7 -0.9 -1.1 2.2 4.5 -0.5 1.3 
Congo,  Dem.  Rep.  -5.6 -1.6 -4.3 -6.2 -2.1 3.5  5  -1.6 
Ethiopia  4.7 -1.4  6  5.4 7.7 1.2 -3.8 2.8 
Kenya  2.1 1.6 1.3 -0.1 1.2  1  1.5 1.2 
Madagascar  3.7 3.9 4.7 4.8  6 -12.7  9.6 2.9 
Rwanda  13.8  8.9  7.6 6 6.7  9.4  0.9  7.6 
Tanzania  3.5 3.7 3.7 5.6 6.1 6.3 5.5 4.9 
Uganda  5.1 4.7 7.9 5.4 5.3 6.7 4.9 5.7 
East  Africa  3.4 3.1 3.3 2.5 4.1 2.5 2.9 3.1 
Notes:  Highlighted countries are closest to the 7 % GDP growth rate needed to achieve the MDGs. 
Source:  IMF World Economic Outlook Database, 2004   10
Table 2:  Comparisons of Malnutrition Across Countries 
    Children Underweight (%)  Child Stunting (%) 
  Calories National Urban  Rural  National Urban  Rural 
Southern Africa         
Angola  1900 32.4 29.7 32.4 45.2 43.3  49.6
Botswana  2270 12.5 11.5 13.6 23.1 23  23.1
Lesotho  2310 17.9 13.3 18.9 45.5 39  47
Malawi  2170 25.2 12.9 27.3 49 34.2  51.3
Mozambique  1950 26.1 20 28.2 35.9 27.3  38.9
Namibia  2700 26.2 17.6 29.9 28.5 21.8  31.4
South Africa  2890 8.5 9 14 24.9 19.8  30.1
Zambia  1900 27.9 23.4 30.3 46.8 36.7  51.3
Zimbabwe  2100 13 7.5 15.6 26.5 20.6  29.2
West Africa    
Benin  2480 22.9 17.9 25.4 30.7 24.4  33.9
Burkina Faso  2460 34.5 22.3 36 36.8 22.7  38.8
Cameroon  2240 20.0 14.3 25 29.3 22.3  31.8
Central African Rep  1960 22 22.4 23.6 23.5 26.2  29.7
Chad  2150 38.2 26.4 28.5 29.1 25.5  30
C￿te d’Ivoire  2830 23.6 13.2 25.1 25.1 18.2  28.6
Gabon  2580 12.2 10 16.8 20.7 17.4  28.9
Gambia  2280 24.7 9 21 19.1 13.2  22.3
Ghana  2620 24.1 15.6 27.9 25.9 14.3  29.7
Guinea  2330 19.1 22.4 37.4 40.9 31.4  46.9
Mali  2370 34.2 20.2 37.1 38.2 24  42.5
Mauritania  2730 32.6 26.7 35.9 34.5 30.2  37.9
Niger  2130 40.4 29.9 41.7 39.7 26.3  41.8
Nigeria  2770 29.2 26.7 27.7 33.5 24.6  27.3
Senegal  2280 23.3 15.4 26.4 25.4 18.9  28.7
Togo  2310 24.4 16.1 27.9 21.7 14.8  23.9
East Africa                     
Burundi  1610 43.1 21.5 46.9 56.8 33.3  58.6
Congo, DR  1570 34.4 23 38.6 45.2 28.1  51.9
Eritrea  1670 39.6 29.1 44.9 37.6 27.9  42.5
Ethiopia  1910 46.5 33.9 48.7 51.5 42.2  52.6
Kenya  2040 21.6 13.3 23.9 33 24.7  34.7
Madagascar  2070 40 35.6 41 48.3 44.6  49.2
Rwanda  2000 28.3 15.3 25.9 48.1 27.4  45.3
Tanzania  1970 29.4 20.6 31.4 43.8 26.1  47.6
Uganda  2470 23.6 12.4 23.6 39.1 26.5  39.9
Note:   Percentages are for children under 5 years old, except for Cameroon, Madagascar, and Togo where the 
percentages are for children under 3 years old.  Children are classified as "underweight" or "stunting" if 
they fall below two standard deviations below the mean for the international reference group.  Data are for 
the most recent year available for each country.   
Source:  FAO/FIVIMS and World Health Organization   11
Seizing Market Opportunities  
Despite these downward trends, there is considerable potential for Africa to 
increase agricultural growth and alleviate hunger and poverty.  Contrary to the pessimism 
expressed in some quarters, adequate market opportunities exist that have yet to be fully 
exploited and that could support more rapid and sustained agricultural growth in Africa.  
Staple foods represent a promising domestic market opportunity, particularly because 
Africa is not only a net importer of many staple foods but also because projections show 
that continent-wide demand for human consumption and livestock feed will double by 
2015, adding another $50 billion per year to effective demand (IFPRI 2002).  Many 
African farmers are well positioned to compete in these staple markets.  There is also 
some scope for increasing traditional agricultural exports (e.g. coffee, tea, cocoa, cotton 
and sugar) but primarily through trade negotiations as well as through improving quality 
and capturing niche markets, such as organics (Diao et al. 2003). While there is limited 
small farm involvement in non-traditional exports (e.g. fruits, flowers, vegetables and 
some processed foods), which precludes this sector from raising incomes and reducing 
poverty on the scale required in most countries by 2015, they have the fewest demand 
constraints and remain the most profitable option.  Moreover, growing urban markets in 
Africa are increasing the demand for more diverse and higher value-added foods, thereby 
offering new opportunities for many African farmers.  
Overall, there appears to be room for significant growth in agricultural sales if 
African small farmers can become progressively more competitive along the entire 
supply chain. For example, establishing a uniform system for grading and controlling the 
quality of agricultural products would go a long way toward sharpening Africa￿s 
competitive edge in global markets.  In addition, reducing the exorbitant marketing 
margins created by transportation and transaction expenses would substantially lower 
food costs and raise producer incomes.  Reducing these margins involves improvements 
in road and transportation networks, increased access to market information systems, and 
enhanced coordination and contractual arrangements among farmers, traders, and buyers. 
An added advantage is that these investments in rural infrastructure and market   12
development would facilitate links with the non-farm sector, stimulating overall income 
and employment in both rural and urban areas and leading to additional demands for 
agricultural products.  
Moreover, many African countries possess a comparative advantage in those 
commodities imported by other African countries. By reducing their trade barriers in both 
the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, African countries can increase intra-regional 
agricultural trade by more than 50 percent (Diao and Yanoma, 2003).  Intra-African trade 
can also increase food security by facilitating the transfer of production from high 
potential agro-ecological zones to areas with structural food deficits.  In some cases, such 
as southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique, these high potential areas may be better 
integrated with markets in neighboring countries than domestic ones.  Since cross-border 
exports may not be subject to the same level of stringent quality standards required for 
international markets, intra-African trade might be more accessible to smallholders 
(Peacock  et. al., 2004).   Greater cross-border trade in food staples could also help 
stabilize food supplies and prices at sub-regional levels in drought years. 
As an example of the potential growth opportunities that exist in African 
agriculture, economy-wide simulations conducted by IFPRI reveal that if food (livestock 
and grain) and exportable goods (traditional and non-traditional) grow at 1.5 percent and 
6 percent per year, respectively, while productivity in manufacturing and service sectors 
grows at 4 percent per year, then despite markets clearing at lower prices, per capita 
agricultural income grows at 2.97 percent per year, per capita food consumption grows 
by 2 percent per year, and per capita agricultural exports grow by 5.7 percent per year 
(Diao et al.  2003).  
Strengthening Pan-African Commitment   
Although intra-African trade is still a small proportion of total African trade, the 
value of a sub-regional approach to trade has long been recognized.  The 1991 Abuja 
Treaty advocated consolidation of tariff and non-tariff barriers, strengthening sectoral 
integration at the continental level, and strengthening the existing sub-regional economic   13
groups and establishing new ones where necessary.  More recently, there have been 
important developments in many of Africa￿s sub-regional economic communities (RECs) 
that offer great promise (These are discussed in more detail below).   Despite the 
continuing challenges facing these RECs, they promote greater intra-African trade and 
provide a means for countries to pool resources, take advantage of economies of scale, 
and ultimately achieve the capacity to be a competitive force in the global market 
(Mutasa, 2003). 
The sub-regional focus promoted by RECs will also be integral to the workings of 
the New Partnership for Africa￿s Development (NEPAD).  Established in 2001, NEPAD 
offers an important forum for generating pan-African consensus and action to achieve 
development goals.  Since agriculture is one of NEPAD￿s five focus areas, the 
organization launched in 2002 the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development 
Program (CAADP), which concentrates on land and water reclamation and management, 
infrastructure and markets, food production and hunger reduction, and institutional 
capacity building (FAO and NEPAD, 2002).  Recognizing the decline in public 
expenditures on agriculture, African Heads of State and Government pledged in 2003 to 
allocate at least 10 percent of their national budgets to implement the CAADP and 
expressed their desire to achieve throughout the continent a six percent annual growth in 
the agricultural sector over the next 20 to 25 years.   Since then, a number of NEPAD 
member countries have increased the level of national contributions to the sector and 
offered tax and other incentives to attract private investment to agriculture (FAO 2004).    
Sustaining International Support  
The efforts of African governments to revitalize smallholder agriculture need to 
be supported by the international community.  Encouragingly, the major conferences 
following the Millennium Summit have echoed commitment to the goal of slashing 
hunger and poverty and have acknowledged the significant role of agriculture in 
achieving this goal, which indicates that this is not just a passing fad within the 
development community.    Participants at the World Food Summit:  Five Years Later in 
June 2002 called for an increase in funding in both donor and African national budgets   14
for agricultural and rural development.  At the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development in August/ September 2002, it was once again echoed that agriculture plays 
a significant role in providing equitable development (IFAD 2003).  In April 2004, an 
IFPRI-organized conference Assuring Food and Nutrition Security in Africa by 2020 
brought together three African Presidents as well as government officials, researchers, 
members of the business community, and representatives of multilateral and bilateral 
development organizations to examine the progress and remaining challenges to 
achieving food and nutrition security in Africa by the year 2020.  Approximately 61 
percent of conference participants stated that they believed food security can be attained 
in Africa by 2020, and almost 92 percent claimed that they were even more committed to 
the goal at the end of the conference than they were at the beginning.   
In addition, key bilateral donors, including the Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA), the Department for International Development (DFID), 
and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) have developed extensive 
agricultural and rural development programs.  Yet, the levels of financial support to 
African agriculture remain disappointing.  Indeed, even though overseas development 
assistance (ODA) from members of the OECD￿s Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) has increased to Africa, their ODA to African agriculture has fallen.     
Specifically, ODA to Africa from the United States increased from 1.5 billion USD in 
2000 to 2.3 billion USD by 2002.  However, Figure 1 shows that the share allotted to 
African agriculture decreased from 8 to 4 percent during the same period and was 
overshadowed by the amount dedicated to both emergency and non-emergency food aid.  
Although the EU devotes more money to agriculture than to food aid, member states have 
demonstrated a similar tendency to allocate more money to Africa over the past few years 
but less to the agricultural sector.      
In addition to increasing ODA allocations, Africa￿s agricultural sector needs 
greater access to international markets.  Existing efforts towards this goal include the 
United States￿ African Growth and Opportunity Act, which provides duty- and quota-free 
access to US markets for almost all products.  Currently, 38 African countries are deemed   15
eligible for AGOA benefits because of their commitment to economic and political 
reforms (ITA).  The European Union, which constitutes Africa￿s largest export market, 
established in 2001 the Everything But Arms (EBA) Initiative, which also grants duty- 
and quota-free access to the imports of all products, excluding arms and munitions, from 
the least developed countries (LDCs) without the LDCs having to give preferential access 
to the EU in return (Hinkle and Schiff, 2004).   Since Africa officially contains 33 LDCs, 
the region is a major target of the EBA.  Unlike other arrangements, such as the Cotonou 
Agreement, one of the major benefits of the EBA is that it does not have a time limit 
(Brenton 2003).   
Figure 1:  Percent of ODA to Africa Allocated to Agriculture 
 
 
Source: Calculations based on data from the OECD Creditor Reporting System 
Nevertheless, the impact of these arrangements has been limited for a number of 
reasons.  First, AGOA and EBA circumscribe the number of beneficiaries because of 
their restrictive rules of origin.  Also, while AGOA accounted for 55 percent of the 
United States￿ imports from Africa in 2003, only about 8 percent of these AGOA imports 
were agricultural products while the majority were petroleum and textile/apparel imports.  
Moreover, most of the AGOA imports are concentrated among only a few countries, such   16
as South Africa, Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, and Angola (Robinson-Morgan 2004).   
Likewise, studies have shown that most African LDCs continue to access the EU through 
the Cotonou Agreement, which offers special tariff-rate quotes for particular 
commodities, rather than through the EBA.  Furthermore, EBA stipulates that full 
liberalization of tariffs on bananas, rice, and sugar, three of the most important export 
commodities for Africa, will not occur until the latter half of the decade (Brenton 2003).   
In addition, the US, EU, and other members of the OECD offer huge subsidies to 
their domestic producers that counteract the potential benefits of preferential trade 
agreements.  For all OECD countries, subsidies total approximately $330 billion and in 
the US alone, subsidies under the Farm Bill equal $15-20 billion per year, exceeding the 
value of Africa￿s total annual agricultural exports (World Bank 2003; FAO/ NEPAD 
2002).  Further negotiation during the current Doha Round of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) on subsidy reform is crucial in order for Africa to benefit from 
world market integration.  In fact, IFPRI model projections reveal that if both the United 
States and the European Union fully opened their markets and eliminated agricultural 
subsidies, Africa￿s total agricultural exports would increase by 20 percent, and the 
region￿s total agricultural income would increase by 5.7 percent (Diao and Yanoma, 
2003).  These projections only reflect the benefits from short-run adjustments in prices, 
production and consumption.  Creating a more favorable market environment can also be 
expected to induce more private investment, thereby leading to longer-term productivity 
growth in African agriculture and offer even larger long-term benefits.   17
II.  DELVING DEEPER INTO AFRICAN TRENDS  
Since the continent consists of numerous countries with a wide range of natural 
endowments, historical and cultural experiences, and political and economic structures, 
Africa-wide averages obscure sub-regional and country level successes and challenges.    
A sub-regional assessment not only provides a more detailed and instructive view of 
agricultural-related developments but also complements efforts, such as NEPAD￿s, to 
promote agricultural growth through taking advantage of economies of scale and 
spillovers across countries.   
Southern Africa 
The Southern Africa region possesses a number of unique characteristics, 
including high urbanization rates, wide income disparities, a historical bias towards 
mineral exports, and the world￿s highest rates of HIV/AIDS.   Despite containing less 
than 2 percent of the world￿s population, it contains 30 percent of all people living with 
HIV/AIDS worldwide (FAO 2003).  Moreover, fertilizer application rates have decreased 
in almost every country while irrigation rates as a percent of cropland remain lower than 
the African average, ranging from 0.3 to 3.5.  Along with a number of other 
compounding factors, these qualities have contributed to stagnant land productivity and 
falling labor productivity (Pardey et. al 2003).    
Southern Africa is also the sub-region where agriculture as a share of GDP is the 
lowest, equaling only about 16 percent of GDP by 2002, even when South Africa is 
excluded.  At 2 percent, average agricultural growth over the last six years is not far 
below the African average of 2.9 percent during the same period but, it remains lower 
than that achieved in the other two sub-regions.  However, at $183 by 2002, per capita 
agricultural incomes are higher than the African average and have slightly increased in 
the sub-region over time.  Incomes are much higher in Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, 
and Swaziland while much lower in Angola, Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia.     18
Combined with bad weather, poor infrastructure, and ineffective macroeconomic 
policies in some countries, the region￿s low food production and agricultural productivity 
culminated in the 2002-2003 famine, during which almost 14 million people faced 
starvation.  More recently, high rainfall has helped the region recover and an increase in 
cereal production reduced the expected amount of food assistance during the 2003-2004 
year.  Yet, drought persists in Lesotho and Swaziland while flooding in Angola, Zambia, 
Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique has damaged crops.  In addition to weather, food 
security in Angola is affected by the integration of internally displaced peoples (IDPs) 
and ex-UNITA soldiers and in Zimbabwe by eroding purchasing power caused by 
escalating inflation due to political instability (FAO GIEWS).  
Notwithstanding these trends, expanding market opportunities offer promise 
about the growth prospects for the region in general and for smallholders in particular.  
For instance, many South African supermarket chains are sourcing fruits and vegetables 
from African countries rather than importing from overseas.  Some are also providing 
technical assistance to local producers and participating in schemes that help small 
farmers better supply food retailers.  For small farmers, the benefits of this arrangement 
include receiving good profits from a stable market while simultaneously being 
compelled to improve the quality of their outputs.  Yet, in order for smallholders to be 
better integrated into the emerging supermarket distribution system, greater effort is 
needed to reduce transaction costs and improve efficiencies along the supply chain.  By 
enhancing the logistical mechanisms of supermarket procurement, Africa￿s markets could 
become less fragmented and thereby allow for greater intra-regional trade (Weatherspoon 
and Reardon, 2003). 
Already, the market value of intra-Southern African trade exceeds that of the 
region￿s trade with the rest of Africa (Diao et. al. 2003).  This trade is facilitated by 
organizations such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU).  In 2000, SADC members signed a Free 
Trade Protocol, which is projected to help trade grow significantly, especially between 
South Africa and the less developed SADC members of Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania,   19
and Zambia (COMESA 2003).   Although still low at 8.8 percent, intra-SADC trade as a 
percentage of SADC￿s total exports has almost tripled between 1990 and 2002 and will 
probably continue to grow as SADC aims to establish a Free Trade Area by 2008 
(UNCTAD).     
SADC is also beginning to grapple with the complex intellectual property rights 
and safety issues related to biotechnology adoption.  All SADC members have agreed to 
develop national technology policies and establish national biosafety regulatory systems.  
They also recently adopted common guidelines for regulating GM crops and for building 
both the capacity and awareness to make decisions on other GM issues (Balile, 2003).  In 
South Africa, which remains the only African country to use GM crops for commercial 
purposes, smallholders are experiencing the benefits of this technology.  In Kwa-Zulu 
Natal, smallholders recently adopted bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) cotton as a more 
effective, lower cost and environmentally benign way of controlling pests than chemical 
spraying.  Findings show that the average yield per hectare and per kilogram per seed was 
about 33 percent higher than for traditional seed varieties.  Even though the cost of Bt 
seeds is higher, the cost is outweighed by the increase in yields and the reduction in 
chemical application costs.  Thus, the gross profit margins are 31 percent higher for 
adopters than for non-adopters (Beyers and Thirtle, 2003).  
Other forms of modern plant breeding have proved equally valuable.  For 
instance, in Zambia and Malawi, disease and pest-resistant varieties of cassava that 
require few purchased inputs and can double yields with the same amount of labor and 
land have increased production by an average annual growth rate of between 6 and 8 
percent per year.  Smallholders dominate cassava production and those who market their 
crops have doubled their cash returns while subsistence farmers have enjoyed increased 
food security (Haggblade and Zulu, 2003).   
The impact of technology and trade developments on poverty reduction among 
smallholders will vary according to country-specific conditions.  In Zambia, for instance, 
poverty has actually increased over the past 30 years with 58 percent of the population 
living below the national poverty line.  According to IFPRI model projections, the   20
country will not halve poverty until 2040 if it continues at its current annual per capita 
GDP growth rate of 1.8 percent (Thurlow, 2004).  High inflation, erratic exchange rate 
movements, steep interest rates, heavy dependence on copper exports and foreign aid, 
and incomplete implementation of structural reforms partially account for the country￿s 
economic stagnation.  There are also problems specific to the agricultural sector.   
Approximately 73 percent of the country￿s 5.6 million small-scale farmers are living in 
poverty (CSO, 1998).  They are hindered by poor infrastructure, a lack of agricultural 
finance and credit, weak access to land and other agricultural inputs, and inadequate 
irrigation systems.  Recent droughts and the HIV/AIDS pandemic have exacerbated their 
situation (AfDB 2003).  Consequently, IFPRI projections indicate that in order to halve 
poverty by 2015, Zambia requires an 8.4 percent annual GDP per capita growth rate, 
which can only be achieved through balanced growth across all sectors of the economy.  
Given current circumstances, the ability of agriculture to contribute to this growth rate 
will depend on significant improvements in infrastructure and market development 
(Thurlow, 2004).   
One example of the private sector assisting with market development is in seed 
cotton production, which has increased fivefold in Zambia from 20,000 to 100,000 metric 
tons between 1995 and 2002 (Voest 2002).  Cotton has become the main cash crop for 
smallholders, who produce over 98 percent of the country￿s cotton. The productivity of 
Zambia￿s smallholder cotton farmers is higher than the average for Africa with many 
achieving yields of 1200 kilograms per hectare compared with the African average yield 
of 825 kilograms per hectare.  Much of the increased production can be attributed to the 
private cotton firms providing agricultural credit for smallholders by deducting the costs 
of inputs from farmers￿ earnings at the time of sale (Grovereh et. al, 2000).  In the 
medium term, smallholder production may be boosted even more as African countries 
demand locally grown cotton to produce and export garments to the United States under 
AGOA (Voest 2002).   
Similarly, smallholder agricultural production is particularly important for 
reducing poverty in Mozambique, especially since 80 percent of the population depends   21
on agriculture for their livelihoods, 71 percent of the rural population lives below the 
national poverty line, and 98 percent of the country￿s farms are smaller than three 
hectares.  Even though it is still recovering from both a civil war that ended over a decade 
ago and disastrous floods in 2000, the country￿s average GDP growth rate between 2000 
and 2003 averaged 8.1 percent with agricultural growth reaching 13 and 9 percent in 
2001 and 2002, respectively.  Encouragingly, agricultural production particularly 
increased among smallholder crops, such as maize, cashew nuts, and cotton.  Sugarcane 
production also increased substantially, by about 172 percent in 2002, and even though 
60 percent of sugarcane cultivation occurs on large plantations, the rehabilitation of the 
sugar industry has created new jobs in the rural areas among the peasant population, 
thereby showing the potential for stimulating backwards linkages (MoPF, 2003).   
These positive developments can be partially attributed to the Government￿s 
continued commitment to macroeconomic reforms that control the level of public 
expenditure and maintain low inflation.  It is also due to the efforts of the government￿s 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MADER), which is disseminating 
improved agricultural production techniques, simplifying the procedures related to land 
use rights, promoting greater access to input markets and agricultural commercialization, 
and creating rural micro-finance institutions.  Admittedly, government expenditure on 
agricultural and rural development as a percentage of total expenditures has increased 
only marginally, from 5.2 percent in 1999 to 5.5 percent in 2002.  Nevertheless, the 
government￿s expenditures on complementary sectors, including education, health, and 
infrastructure, are quite high.  Among other interventions, the Government intends to 
expand the number of available roads in order to integrate poor, isolated regions into 
national markets and help reduce transport costs (MoPF, 2003).   
West Africa  
Despite recent wars in Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia as well as continuing 
instability in C￿te d￿Ivoire, the West African sub-region has experienced the continent￿s 
highest rates of growth over the past six years with both GDP and agricultural growth   22
averaging around three percent.  Although per capita agricultural incomes decreased by 
35 percent between 2001 and 2002, from $315 to $204, the sub-region still has higher per 
capita agricultural incomes than the other two sub-regions.  Similarly, per capita food and 
agricultural production has not skyrocketed but West Africa has at least maintained its 
1989-1990 level of production while the other two sub-regions have experienced a 
decrease (Figure 2).    
Figure 2:  Comparison of Per Capita Agricultural Production Across Sub-
Regions 
Source:  FAOSTAT 
Regardless of this growth, the region could benefit from increased use of 
agricultural inputs.  Most of the countries only use one-third of their potentially arable 
land and irrigate about one percent or less of arable cropland.  Even though fertilizer 
application rates are slightly higher than those found in East Africa, they are more than 
twice as low than those in Southern Africa.   While HIV/AIDS prevalence is not as high 
as in Southern Africa, it still averages around 5 percent of the adult population and 
according to a recent FAO report, HIV/AIDS will cause C￿te d￿Ivoire and Burkina Faso 
to lose between 24 percent and 20 percent of their work forces by 2020.  Other diseases,   23
including measles and malaria, also pose significant risks to the region￿s labor 
productivity (FAO 2002).   
In the immediate future, the ability of agriculture to contribute further to the sub-
region￿s growth requires improvements in the trade environment.  Already, the sub-
region is benefiting from the recovery of prices for its two main export commodities:  
cocoa and cotton (Figure 3).  Nevertheless, the production of West African cotton, which 
is a critical export crop for smallholders, remains stymied by the $6 billion in subsidies 
bestowed by the US, EU, and China on their domestic cotton producers.  The Sectoral 
Initiative in Favor of Cotton submitted by Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali during 
the Cancun Conference of the Doha Round highlighted that the four countries jointly lose 
about 250 million dollars in annual export revenue because of these subsidies (WTO, 
2003).  Indeed, the subsidies are responsible for a 10-40 percent decline in world cotton 
prices (Diao 2003b).  Meanwhile, research in Benin shows that just a one percent fall in 
world prices causes the incidence of poverty among cotton producing households to 
increase by 1.5 percent (Badiane).   
Figure 3:  World Prices (US cents / lb. ) for Selected Commodities 
Source:  FAO￿s Commodities and Trade Division, International Cocoa Organization (ICCO), International 
Coffee Organization  (ICO), COTLOOK   24
Although further negotiations on international trade conditions are crucial, IFPRI 
model projections show that intra-African market improvements in the cotton sector 
would have an even bigger impact.  By reducing marketing margins in cotton trade, the 
total value of African cotton exports rises by more than 60 percent, tripling the gains that 
occur from liberalizing world cotton markets and eliminating developed countries￿ cotton 
subsidies.  Lowering trade margins raises the real prices faced by cotton producers and 
hence production of cotton increases by 37 percent, which is more than four times greater 
than the gains obtained from trade liberalization (Diao 2003b).   
Already, West African countries are exploring possibilities for greater sub-
regional trade spillovers.  Although intra-African trade is greater than intra-West African 
trade, greater trade occurs within the sub-region￿s economic communities than in those of 
Southern and East Africa.  Indeed, trade within the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) as a percentage of its total exports equals 11.1 percent and 
might increase as the ECOWAS countries that do not belong to the francophone-
dominated West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) pursue fast track 
monetary harmonization in the near future (COMESA 2003).  As for the countries within 
WAEMU, trade is equal to 12.6 percent of total exports (UNCTAD). 
Smallholders are increasingly taking advantage of the opportunities offered by 
these organizations.  For instance, ECOWAS protocols and agreements have enabled 
Ghanaian smallholders to participate more actively both in cross-border trade and in the 
production of non-traditional goods (Sarpong, 2003).  In fact, the value of non-traditional 
agricultural exports increased from $26 million in 1993 to about $75 million by 2001.  By 
2001, at least 75 different non-traditional agricultural products were being exported, 
including seafood, pineapples, yams, and shea nuts (DAI, 2003).  Smallholders have also 
been introduced to sunflower cultivation, which requires little herbicide, pesticide, and 
fertilizer, and has modest water requirements.  Smallholders benefit from the President￿s 
Special Initiative to diversify smallholder agricultural incomes as well as from 
Government provision of improved cassava and rice seeds, credit for fertilizers, and mass 
vaccinations of livestock (AfDB 2003).     25
Recent improvements in macroeconomic stability and progressive reductions in 
external trade tariffs have been conducive to growth in both agriculture and in the wider 
economy, thereby supplementing the Ghanaian Government￿s already impressive strides 
in poverty reduction.  In fact, IFPRI projections show that if the country continues to 
achieve a two percent annual growth rate in per capita GDP, the poverty ratio could be 
reduced from 40 to 20 percent by 2020.  Although this is not far from the MDG, the 
attainment of an annual per capita GDP growth rate of 3.2 percent could halve poverty 
and reduce child malnutrition from 25 to 13 percent by 2015.  In order for staple crops to 
contribute to this increased growth, significant demand constraints, including low non-
agricultural incomes and low growth in the livestock sector that would otherwise increase 
demand for feed, must be overcome.  In order for non-traditional crops to continue 
growing, constraints in trade services and transportation need to be removed (Diao, 
2003a).    
Indeed, landlocked Mali￿s expansion into non-traditional agricultural exports 
occurred through overcoming transportation bottlenecks.  Specifically, a non-profit, 
government-funded agency known as the Agricultural Trading and Processing Promotion 
Agency (APROFA) assisted smallholders during the 2000/2001 crop season with 
improving the quality of their mangoes, establishing a joint venture with an Ivorian 
private operator, and developing sea shipment logistics to connect Mali to the EU market 
through the port of Abidjan.  This resulted in a meteoric rise in Mali￿s mango exports to 
the EU, enabling the industry to become a $1.3 million business.   Moreover, it 
demonstrates the value of planning interventions at every stage of marketing and 
production as well as ensuring that the supply chain addresses market requirements 
(Danielou et. al., 2003).   
Likewise, horticultural exports are becoming an important agricultural sub-sector 
in Senegal.  Between 1998 and 2001, exports of fruits and vegetables grew by 
approximately 41 percent in volume, from 6592 tons to 9352 tons, and increased by 7 
percent per annum in dollar terms, which exceeded total export growth during the same 
period.  Moreover, these exports became more diversified to include cherry tomatoes,   26
mangoes, melons, papaya, and asparagus to complement long-standing trade in green 
beans.  By 2007, it is projected that the volume of total exports will more than double to 
22,450 tons.  Among other factors, the sector￿s growth has been assisted by an 
autonomous agency known as the Agricultural Export Promotion Project (AEPP). In 
addition to conducting studies about horticulture￿s market potential, supporting producer 
groups active in the sector, and providing information on quality standards in foreign 
markets, the AEPP has ongoing plans to create refrigeration centers, rehabilitate freight 
facilities at the Dakar airport, provide technical assistance, and engage in pilot projects.  
Although considerable constraints remain, including insufficient infrastructure and 
market integration, growth in the sector can contribute significantly to rural poverty 
reduction.   Smallholders are particularly dominant in export horticulture and because of 
the sector￿s labor-intensive nature, it can create a number of employment opportunities 
(IF 2003).  In fact, the sector has thus far created 10,000 rural jobs, 35 percent of which 
are filled by women (IFLEX 2004). 
In addition to taking advantage of burgeoning market and trade opportunities, the 
West African sub-region is adopting technologies that are suitable to its unique 
geography and climate.  Most notably, the cross-breeding of high yielding Asian rice 
varieties with drought- and disease-resistant African varieties resulted in New Rice for 
Africa (NERICA) cultivars, which have been introduced to 17 West and Central African 
countries.  NERICA not only requires less fertilizer and provides more protein than 
conventional varieties but also predominantly benefits women and the poorest 
smallholders.   Research indicates that by 2006, the savings for the West African region 
in terms of rice imports will be approximately USD 88 million annually.  The 
contribution of NERICA is so significant that its main developers, Dr. Monty Jones and 
Professor Yuan Longping won the 2004 World Food Prize (WARDA 2004).    
East Africa 
Conflict has plagued a majority of East Africa￿s countries, stymieing growth and 
exacerbating food insecurity.  Although agricultural and GDP growth rates between 1996   27
and 2002 are on par with those of the other two sub-regions, East Africa has the lowest 
per capita agricultural incomes, per capita agricultural production, and per capita food 
production.  At the same time, almost 80 percent of East Africa￿s population depends on 
agriculture for their livelihoods and agriculture constitutes 40 percent of the region￿s 
GDP, figures that are substantially higher than in the other two sub-regions.   
Traditionally, East Africa has received more cereal food aid than the other two 
regions, a trend predominantly driven by Ethiopia and Eritrea and to a lesser extent, 
Rwanda, Kenya, and Sudan.  High food insecurity has coincided with high malnutrition.  
In particular, per capita energy intake has actually decreased by 100 calories over the last 
decade, a trend especially driven by declines in Burundi, the DRC, Madagascar, and 
Tanzania.   The sub-region not only has Africa￿s highest rate of child stunting, around 44 
percent, but also has experienced no improvement in this area within the last decade.  
Moreover, East Africa is the only sub-region expected to experience an increase in the 
percentage of children underweight by 2005 (UNSCN 2004).   
However, these generally negative trends obscure not only the vast disparities 
between the region￿s countries but also positive policy changes that have yet to make an 
impact on the data.  For instance, Ethiopia has East Africa￿s lowest per capita agricultural 
incomes and structural food insecurity plagues about 2 to 3 million people every year.  
The country is not only grappling with its vulnerability to extreme weather conditions but 
also recovering from protracted conflict with Eritrea and declining coffee prices.  Since 
the 1990s, the current government has engaged in a series of reforms, such as market 
liberalization, subsidy removal, and tariff reductions, to transform the country from a 
command economy (AfDB, 2003).  Nevertheless, malnutrition and poverty in Ethiopia 
are major problems with 47 and 57 percent of children underweight and stunted, 
respectively, and 44 percent of the total population living below the poverty line.   
Since agriculture constitutes about 40 percent of the country￿s GDP and 
represents a source of livelihood for about 85 percent of the population, growth in 
agriculture is crucial for reducing hunger and poverty. However, IFPRI model projections 
show that if the sector continues to grow at its current rate, the population living in   28
poverty will actually increase by 2015.  If there were annual productivity improvements 
of 1.2 percent, 3.1 percent, and 8.8 percent in the staples, livestock, and nontraditional 
export sectors, respectively, a 4.3 GDP growth rate and 5.3 agricultural GDP growth rate 
could be achieved and both national and rural poverty would be halved by 2015.  An 
even more substantial impact occurs if productivity increases in these three sectors are 
accompanied by a decrease in marketing costs and a 20 percent productivity increase in 
the service sector.  This scenario results in a 5.3 GDP growth rate and a 6.1 agricultural 
GDP growth rate, which subsequently causes the national poverty ratio to fall to 17 
percent and rural poverty to fall below 20 percent.   Reducing these marketing costs 
involves improving the road network and providing more storage and marketing facilities 
(Diao et. al. 2004).   
These policy prescriptions coincide with the aims of Ethiopia￿s Agricultural 
Development Led Industrialization Strategy (ADLI), which accords agriculture a leading 
role in stimulating growth and providing food security.  Under the ADLI, smallholders 
are targeted through agricultural extension and credit schemes, the expansion of primary 
education and health care, and greater provision of rural roads and water supply.  The 
government has also focused on improving the efficiency of the agricultural input market, 
addressing land tenure issues, and training programs for farmers.  While expenditures on 
agriculture and food security as a share of total expenditures have decreased slightly, 
from 8 to 7.5 percent between 1999-2000 and 2002-2003, expenditures on roads 
increased by 4 percent during the same period and defense expenditures fell by almost 28 
percent (MoFED, 2003). 
In contrast to Ethiopia, Uganda is East Africa￿s wealthiest country, measured in 
terms of GDP per capita and per capita agricultural incomes.  By maintaining low 
inflation and export openness, prudent fiscal management that enables higher investments 
in poverty alleviation, and initiating a set of political, administrative, and managerial 
reforms, the Ugandan government demonstrates its commitment to creating an enabling 
environment for investment and growth.  Indeed, real GDP grew by 6.3 percent in 
2001/02 and agricultural growth has remained at between 4 and 5 percent since 1999.    29
Favorable agricultural output can be partially attributed to good weather conditions as 
well as some of the Government￿s initiatives under the Plan for the Modernization of 
Agriculture (PMA), including the distribution of tea plantlets to households, the supply of 
cotton seeds to ginners, and stocking the lakes with fish.  As the central element of the 
government￿s strategy to increase the incomes of the rural poor, the PMA has been a 
means for increasing the poor￿s access to productive assets, improving rural 
infrastructure, and linking national research to farmers.  Although the agricultural sector 
has suffered from declines in the price of coffee, which led to a $222 million decrease in 
coffee export earnings between 1998 and 2002, there has been an 81 percent increase in 
non-traditional exports during the same period.  In fact, non-traditional exports account 
for 65 percent of all goods exports, and earnings have increased from $165 million in 
1998 to $300 million in 2002.   This reflects the government￿s progress at export 
diversification, which it began pursuing through a program for strategic intervention in 
the fish, horticulture, tea, coffee, cotton, livestock, and ICT sectors. 
Nevertheless, a number of trends indicate that the country still has a long way to 
go.  First, the share of government expenditures on agriculture during the last three years 
only average at 2 percent while expenditures on public administration and security are 
17.5 and 13 percent, respectively.   Secondly, the security situation in the Northern area 
of the country, where the government is fighting the Lord￿s Resistance Army rebels, 
continues to exacerbate regional wealth inequalities.  Thirdly, despite reductions in dollar 
a day poverty, rural poverty is a high 85 percent.  Although the percent of children under 
five years of age who are underweight has decreased from 27 to 23 percent between 1995 
and 2001, the percent of child stunting increased from 36 to 39 percent during the same 
period and 28 and 64 percent of children suffer from vitamin A deficiency and anemia, 
respectively (AfDB, 2003;  MoFPED, 2003).     
Along with Kenya and Tanzania, Uganda revived the East African Community 
(EAC) in 1999, which could facilitate greater regional trade and infrastructure 
investments.  All three countries have already removed a large percentage of tariff and 
non-tariff barriers on cross-border trade and are continuing to implement a regional road   30
network and railway system (COMESA 2003).  By establishing an East African Customs 
Union (EACU) in March 2004, the members aim for a common external tariff and to 
reduce internal tariffs to zero by 2008.  In addition, the EAC intends to increase regional 
economic output through interventions in the areas of agriculture and energy (MoFPED, 
2003).  Currently, however, the relationship among member countries is not equal.   
While Kenya possesses a favorable intra-EAC trade balance, Tanzania and Uganda both 
have considerable deficits.  Since most of their trade is with the European Union, Kenya 
is the destination for only 4.6 percent of Uganda￿s exports and less than 3 percent of 
Tanzania￿s (Mutasa, 2003). 
All of the countries within East Africa, along with 6 in Southern Africa, belong to 
the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA).  In October 2000, 
COMESA established a Free Trade Area (FTA) that eliminates tariff and non-tariff 
barriers on goods from other COMESA members.   During the first three years of 
operation, intra-FTA trade grew on average by 25 percent per annum, and intra-
COMESA trade equaled $4.5 billion by 2002.  In the near future, COMESA member 
countries also anticipate adopting a common external tariff, standardizing tax and 
investment laws, promoting the adoption of a single currency and eventually establishing 
a monetary union (Mwencha, 2004).   
Many countries are also expanding into non-traditional agricultural exports, which 
are valued at about $1.4 billion for the sub-region (Diao et. al. 2003).  This is particularly 
the case in Kenya where the value of fruit and vegetable exports has grown by over $147 
million since independence and increased from 3 percent of agricultural exports to 17 
percent during the same period.  Kenyan smallholders produce about 60 percent of 
horticultural exports and benefit by about $46 million from the industry.  Besides 
providing direct income to producers, the industry increases domestic food security and 
creates multiplier effects as horticultural producers purchase the goods and services of 
other rural households.  Limited direct government intervention in the horticultural 
market combined with realistic exchange rates and the maintenance of relative 
macroeconomic stability have not only stimulated exports but also attracted private   31
domestic and international investment.  The sector also benefits both from investments in 
agricultural research as well as from an extensive road network in the highland areas that 
enables fast transfer to the airport (Minot and Ngigi, 2003).  Moreover, supermarkets that 
have entered Kenya purchase three times the volume of fruits and vegetables than Kenya 
sells on the international export market (Weatherspoon and Reardon, 2003).   
In addition to horticultural exports, research indicates that East Africa, which 
contains over 40 percent of Africa￿s cattle resources, is the promising sub-region for 
increasing dairy production.  For example, in Kenya, the sector has grown at 2.8 percent 
annually over the last twenty years with smallholders producing almost 80 percent of the 
country￿s milk.  These smallholders have identified milk production as their fastest 
growing income source.  Some of the reasons for this sector￿s growth include increased 
output prices due to market liberalization and the introduction of highly productive 
breeds of dairy cows (Ngigi 2003). 
Increased investments in agricultural productivity in the sub-region are also on the 
horizon.  For instance, CIDA has pledged to allocate $22.5 million to establish a 
Biosciences Facility for Central and Eastern Africa (Dickson, 2003).  Based at the 
International Livestock Research Institute￿s (ILRI) Nairobi facilities, researchers at the 
Center will focus on developing nutrient-rich plants that are resistant to disease and stress 
and create vaccines against livestock diseases.  In addition, the Kenyan Agricultural 
Research Institute (KARI) recently announced the launch of a $12.5 million, five-year 
agricultural biotechnology program that will develop, among other things, livestock 
vaccines and virus-resistant sweet potato (Chege and Mboyah, 2003).   
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III. CONCLUSION 
Examining trends, projections, and case studies across sub-regions and countries 
validates the need for both prudence and optimism about the ability of Africa￿s 
smallholders to contribute to and benefit from reductions in hunger and poverty.   
At the aggregate level, Africa is far from achieving the MDGs and less than one-
third of the countries in the region are even close to the 7 percent GDP growth rate 
deemed necessary to halve poverty by 2015.  Likewise, the goals of NEPAD￿s CAADP 
to increase agricultural growth by 6 percent and public expenditures on the agricultural 
sector by 10 percent have thus far eluded most African countries.   
On the other hand, however, recent research and past experience provides a great 
deal of guidance on which interventions can assist with reaching these targets.  Tellingly, 
high transaction costs caused by inadequate physical infrastructure and poor market 
development are repeatedly identified as hindrances to reducing poverty within countries 
and to generating growth within particular agricultural sectors.  Indeed, many African 
countries are diversifying into non-traditional agricultural exports but the nature of the 
sector requires access to storage and refrigeration facilities as well as close proximity to 
roads and airports.  Addressing transaction costs will also be instrumental in creating 
linkages between smallholders and expanding industries, such as supermarkets and the 
textile sector.  In addition, investments in biotechnology can assist with reducing required 
inputs, increasing the nutritional content of food crops, and mitigating against the effects 
of droughts, diseases and pests.   
Achievements thus far within each sub-region￿s RECs provide a glimpse of the 
possibilities for creating synergies across countries and benefiting from economies of 
scale.  Specifically, they offer a forum for negotiating tariff reductions, thereby 
promoting greater intra-sub-regional trade, as well as for collaborating on infrastructure 
investments.  As evidenced in SADC, these RECs can also assist with formulating 
common policies for dealing with biotechnology issues.     33
Most significantly, genuine and sustained political commitment to agriculture is 
paramount, particularly since lack of political will is often identified as the major 
constraint in achieving food and nutrition security in Africa (FAO 2004; IFPRI 2004).  In 
fact, a recent survey of experts on African agricultural successes revealed that 
government policymakers, agricultural ministries, and extension services are most 
frequently seen as the initiators of positive change.  This reflects that many of the 
necessary ingredients for agricultural growth, such as research and infrastructure, are 
public goods that require government involvement and support (Gabre-Madhin and 
Haggblade, 2003).  Moreover, governments play a key role in both providing an enabling 
macroeconomic policy environment and actively assisting smallholders.  Indeed, in those 
countries where governments have developed and implemented an agricultural strategy, 
smallholders are beginning to gain access to crucial input and output markets.   
Fortunately, the efforts of NEPAD and the achievements of governments 
highlighted throughout this paper demonstrate that the commitment among African 
leaders is forthcoming and that agriculture is at the top of most African countries￿ 
agendas.  International donors must echo this commitment by achieving greater 
coherence between their trade and aid policies as well as by clarifying how their 
agricultural initiatives fit with those of African governments, NEPAD, and other donors.  
This would not only elucidate where there are opportunities for coordination and scaling 
up but also help ensure that multiple initiatives do not undermine each other.  In this 
manner, case studies of smallholder successes could become less exceptional and more 
instrumental in generating a positive reversal in aggregate trends.    
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